Ju1C, 1939

RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938-Tobacco farmers sought in a Georgia state court
to enjoin local warehousemen from deducting marketing penalties on
tobacco offered for sale above the quotas fixed by the Secretary of Agriculture under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938,' on the ground
that the Act was unconstitutional.2 The United States intervened as a
defendant and, after removal to the federal court, a three-judge tribunal
dismissed the bill. Held (justices Butler and McReynolds dissenting),
decree affirmed. The Act is a constitutional exercise of the commerce
power.3 Mulford, et al. v. Smith, et al., 6 U. S. L. WEEK ii6o (U. S.
Sup. Ct. 1939).
By this decision, the Supreme Court has, after a little more than two
years, nullified the effects of the Butler case 4 in which the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 19335 was declared invalid as an unconstitutional
exercise of the taxing power. In that case the Court held that the regulation of agricultural production attempted under the Act was an invasion
of intrastate affairs. The result of the instant case rests upon a distinction
drawn by the Court between production and marketing. The Act, it was
said, places no limit or penalty upon the production of tobacco but instead
restricts the amount of the commodity which may be transported into
interstate commerce. It, therefore, is "within the competency of Congress". 6 Mr. Justice Roberts added that "The motive of Congress in exerting the power is irrelevant to the validity of the legislation." 7 The
minority opinion not only agreed with the contentions of the appellants, but
argued further that, even assuming the Act imposed a penalty for marketing in interstate commerce, such restriction was not authorized by the comI. 52 STAT. 31, 7 U. S. C. A. § 6oi (Supp. 1938). Under the Act the Secretary of
Agriculture is authorized to establish marketing quotas for five basic crops, tobacco,
corn, wheat, rice, and cotton, in case the carry-over from the previous year reaches a
certain point. The quotas, however, are not to be established unless approved by twothirds of the farmers to be affected as shown by a referendum to be conducted by the
Secretary. In this way it is hoped to achieve, in Secretary Wallace's phrase, an "evernormal granary". (The phrase was used by the Secretary in a radio address on Feb.
17, 1938.)

2. The attack was three-fold: "(I) that the Act is a statutory plan to control
agricultural production and, therefore, beyond the powers delegated to Congress; (2)
that the standard for calculating farm quotas is uncertain, vague, and indefinite, resulting in an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Secretary; (3) that,
as applied to appellants' 1938 crop, the Act takes their property wvithout due process of
law." Instant case at 1161. The Court rejecfed all three arguments.
3. Actually, the instant case involved only the validity of the quota program as
applied to the marketing of tobacco. The broad basis upon which the case was argued,

however, and the language of the majority opinion itself leaves little doubt as to the allinclusive scope of the decision. "The provisions of the Act under review constitute a

regulation of interstate and foreign commerce within the competency of Congress under
the power delegated to it by the Constitution." Instant case at 1161.
4. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. I (1936). Mr. Justice Roberts wrote the

majority opinion in both cases but he did not even cite the Butler case in the later
opinion. Mr. Justice Stone, who concurred in the majority opinion in the Mulord case,
is the only Justice now left on the Court who had dissented in the Butler case.
5. 48 STAT. 31 (1933), 7 U. S. C. A. § 6oi (1934).

6. Instant case at 1161.
7. Ibid.
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merce clause." Looked at practically, there can be little doubt that, although the Act of 1938 relies upon the commerce clause while the Act of
1933 relied primarily upon the power to tax and spend for the general welfare, 9 the ultimate purposes of both Acts are identical-the control of surpluses. Indeed it has been said that by regulation of marketing, production
is much more effectively controlled than by any limitation of planting.10
When the power to regulate marketing is coupled with the price-fixing
power under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act" plus the possibility that processing taxes may be revived,1 2 it is apparent that the new
Act is a much more potent weapon in controlling production than was the
Act of 1933. Still the majority opinion in the instant case at least impliedly
adheres to the rule of the Butler case that the federal government is without power to control farm production.13 In view of the actual practical
effects of the decision, however, it must be admitted that the Court has
tacitly receded from that position.

Corporations-Right of a Corporation to Bring Suit in its Corporate Name without the Aid of an Attorney at Law-Plaintiff corporation brought suit for a small bill of twenty-five dollars in a city court and
signed the summons and complaint by its corporate name. Defendant
moved to strike the summons and complaint on the grounds that a corporation may not sue in propria personae but must appear by a duly
authorized attorney. Held, that the corporation may appear in propria
personae. A. Victor & Co. v. Sleininger, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 323 (App. Div.
4th Dep't, 1939).

This decision seems to be alone in granting the privilege of conducting its own case to a corporation.' It is the universal rule that neither a
layman 2 nor a corporation3 may "practice law'-a term defined to include not only appearance in court and the performance of those functions
incident thereto such as preparing pleadings and briefs, but also the drawing of other documents having legal import such as deeds, wills and formal
contracts. 4
271,

In the case of the individual it is established that he is not

8. Mr. Justice Butler cited and quoted from Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251,
276 (1918), instant case, dissent, 1163.
9. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. I, 63, 64 (1936).
Io. N. Y. Times, April 23, 1936, § 4, p. 7, col. i. See also instant case, dissent, at

1162.
I.

50 STAT. 248 (1937), 7 U. S. C. A. § 671 (Supp. 1938). The Act refers to milk.
12. In the Butler case such taxes were invalidated because they were an incident
of an unconstitutional plan, not because they were themselves unconstitutional. United
States v. Butler, 297 U. S. I, 68 (1936). But see 5o STAT. 249 (1937), 7 U. S. C. A.
§673 (Supp. 1938).
13. Instant case at 1161, dissent at 1162.

i. Bennie v. Triangle Ranch Co., 73 Colo. 586, 216 Pac. 718 (1923); Mortgage
Commission v. Great Neck Imp. Co., 162 Misc. 416, 295 N. Y. Supp. 107 (Sup. Ct.
1937), and cases cited therein. In accord with the instant decision is Selent-Repent
Corp. v. Queens Borough Gas & Elec. Co., 16o Misc. 920, 29o N. Y. Supp. 887 (Sup.
Ct. 1936), but this case was not followed in subsequent New York cases.
2. Heiskell v. Mozie, 82 F. (2d) 861 (App. D. C. 1936); Curry v. Dahlberg, 341
Mo. 897, 110 S. W. (2d) 742 (1937); Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 Atl. 883

(1934).

3. In re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 6o6, 194 N. E. 313 (1935), and cases
cited therein.
4. Boykin v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S. E. 796 (1932) ; In re Opinion of the
justices, 289 Mass. 6o6, 194 N. E. 313 (1935) ; People v. Peoples Trust Co., i8o App.
Div. 494, 167 N. Y. Supp. 767 (2d Dep't, 1917).
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"practicing law" within the meaning of the prohibition when he performs
the above legal services for himself. 5 The rule is different, however, in
that it may draw its own
the case of the corporation. Despite the fact
6
documents in connection with7the business, it may not appear in court or
prepare its own case for trial. In order to arrive at the latter conclusion,
the courts say that since a corporation can only act through agents and
since only an attorney may represent another in court, the corporation
must necessarily engage an attorney." This view adheres to the theory
that the "corporation" is distinct from its administrative officers.9 Why
this reasoning should not apply to the preparation of legal documents is
not apparent. The instant decision, on the other hand, can be supported
are the corporation for the
on the theory that the administrative officers
purposes of conducting the corporate case. 10 Thus the corporation is relieved of the necessity of hiring an attorney as a condition precedent to its
use of the courts-a condition which might well prove seriously embarrassing to an harassed corporation, its stockholders and creditors. 1 On the
other hand the majority view professes to prevent unscrupulous laymen
and disbarred attorneys from maintaining a flourishing practice under the
cloak of being corporate officers. 12 Since, however, it has been judicially
conceded that the "office" work of the lawyer is more extensive than
"court" work and, in the hands of the unscrupulous, may be more
prejudicial to the interests of the client and the public than services performed under the scrutiny of the judge in court,' 3 the prevention of corporate appearance in court does not eradicate the evil. Furthermore, as
the courts have inherent power to regulate the practice of law 14 and have
been quick to detect and forbid the use of a device to cover the illegal
practice of law,' 5 it is submitted that the disbarred attorney would find his
cloak stripped from him in contempt proceedings. Consequently it seems
that the present case was correct in abandoning an ancient rule which is
supported by no valid reason.
5. Copeland v. Dabbs, 22i Ala. 489, 129 So. 88 (1930) (drawing legal papers);
In re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 6o6, 615, 194 N. E. 313, 317 (1935) ; Abernethy v. Burns, 2o6 N. C. 370, 173 S. E. 899 (1934) (appearance in court).
6. People v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co., 191 App. Div. 165, 181 N. Y. Supp. 52
(2d Dep't, 192o); aff'd, 230 N. Y. 578, 13o N. E. 9O1 (1920); Wollitzer v. National
Title Guaranty Co., 148 Misc. 529, 266 N. Y. Supp. 184 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
7. See supra note i.
8. Mortgage Commission v. Great Neck Imp. Co., 162 Misc. 416, 42o, 295 N. Y.
Supp. 107, 112 (Sup. Ct. 1937), citing Mullin-Johnson Co. v. Penn Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 9 F. Supp. 175 (N. D. Cal. 1934). These cases are concerned with construing
statutes which forbid a corporation to practice as attorney at law for any other person
than itself. This provision is held as not allowing the corporation to appear in propria
personae but only by attorney. For a complete collection of substantially identical
statutes see HicKs AND KATZ, UxAUTHORIZED PRAcTIcE OF LAW (1934) pt. I.
9. See cases cited supra note 8.
IO. Selent-Repent Corp. v. Queens Borough Gas & Elec. Co., 16o Misc. 920, 921,
29o N. Y. Supp. 887, 889 (Sup. Ct. 1936). See Vardeman v. Penn Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 125 Ga. 117, r19, 54 S. E. 66, 67 (19o6), distinguishing between officers and agents
of a corporation and holding that the former as such are the corporation.
ii. This was the reason advanced by the instant court for its holding. Instant case
at 326.
12. Mortgage Commission v. Great Neck Imp. Co., 162 Misc. 416, 422, 295 N. Y.
Supp. 107, 114 (Sup. Ct. 1937). The instant court dismissed this danger as "more
theoretical than substantial". Instant case at 326.
13. People v. Alfani, 227 N. Y. 334, 125 N. E. 671 (1919).
14. In re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 6o6, 194 N. E. 313 (1935).
15. Heiskell v. Mozie, 82 F. (2d) 86I (App. D. C. 1936); Koepple v. Morrison,
84 Cal. App. 137, 257 Pac. 590 (1927) ; Curry v. Dahlberg, 341 Mo. 897, 11O S. V. (2d)
742 (1937).
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Criminal Law-Accessories After the Fact-Does Acquittal of
Principal Preclude Conviction of Accessory When Evidence is Clear
that No Other Persons Were Involved?-Roberts and Weir were separately prosecuted by information for the murder of Butler. Roberts was
acquitted and was immediately charged as an accessory after the fact to
the murder of Butler by Weir. Subsequently Weir was also acquitted,
and the information charging Roberts with the crime of accessory after
the fact to the murder of Butler by Weir was amended, charging that the
murder was committed by "a person or persons unknown to the District
Attorney". Held, that the conviction of Roberts as accessory after the
fact must be sustained.

Roberts v. People, 87 P. (2d) 251 (Colo. 1938).

Although at common law an accessory after the fact could not be
convicted unless the principal be adjudged guilty prior to or at the same
time as the conviction of the accessory,' the offense has now by statute
been made a substantive crime in almost every jurisdiction, 2 including
Colorado.3 Thus the accessory may be tried independently of the principal, although the fact that the crime has been committed must necessarily
be proved as an essential element of the lesser crime of accessory. 4 In the
instant case, the majority of the court proceeded on the ground that the
murder had in fact been committed by Weir although the state might not
be able to establish it for the purpose of imposing a penalty. 5 A sounder
analysis would have been that estoppel by judgment has no application in
criminal law, 6 and therefore, with no new evidence, the jury in the second
trial could well have found Weir to be the murderer for the purpose of
convicting Roberts as an accessory. Although the principal in the prior
trial has his protection against double jeopardy, 7 this defense does not
i. Commonwealth v. Andrews, 3 Mass. 126 (807) ; Brown v. State, 18 Ohio St.
496 (1868) ; Bowen v. State, 25 Fla. 645, 6 So. 459 (889).
2. 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (12th ed. 1932) § 277.
3. COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935) c. 48, § 14.
4. State v. Varnell, 316 Mo. 169, 298 S. W. 844 (1926). To convict an accessory
after the fact, the state must prove that the felony had been committed, the accessory's
knowledge thereof, and his assisting the principal to escape or to conceal the crime.
There is authority to the effect that the acquittal of the principal necessarily rebuts
the guilt of the accessory. In State v. Haines, 51 La. Ann. 731, 25 So. 372 (1899), A,
indicted for the rape of B's wife, was acquitted. The court held that B, indicted as
principal in the second degree for holding his wife down while A raped her, cannot be
convicted if A is acquitted. A clearer case is Ray v. State, 13 Neb. 55, 13 N. W. 2
(1882), where Ray was indicted, tried and convicted for the offense of concealing Wells,
an alleged horse thief. Wells was subsequently acquitted, and it was held that the
lower court's judgment as to Ray must be reversed. Cf. Kelley v. State, 79 Fla. 182, 83
So. 9o9 (1920) ; State v. Fabiano, 175 La. 983, 144 So. 735 (1932). The latter two
deal with principals in the second degree. This group of cases is cited by the minority
for the purpose of showing that the acquittal of Weir releases Roberts as his accessory,
which is neither good law nor sound reasoning.
5. Instant case at 255.
6. State v. Couch, 341 Mo. 1239, II S. W. (2d) 147 (I937), where the defendant
tried to set up as a defense the conviction of another for the same murder, the court
held that the defense could not be pleaded because the appellant was not a party to that
proceeding and was in no way affected by the judgment. In Huggins v. State, 25 Ga.
App. 38, lO3 S. E. 32 (1920) a verdict and judgment of the superior court in a criminal case is set up in bar to the prosecution in that court of another criminal case. It
was decided that the plea is insufficient in law and should be stricken out where it appears that both prosecutions were not against the same defendant. Cf. Seymour v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 775, 112 S. E. 806 (1922). BIGELoW, ESTOPPEL (6th ed. 1913) 99.
See Commonwealth v. Long, 246 Ky. 809, 56 S. W. (2d) 524 (1933) to the effect that
inasmuch as the alleged accessory after the fact may show positively that the principal
was innocent, even though he was convicted, it ought to follow that the state can show
that the principal was guilty even though he has been acquitted.

7.

BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL

(6th ed. 1913) 99.
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avail Roberts who was not a party to the prior trial." This rationale
would also seem to answer the contention of the dissenting judges that
inasmuch as Weir and Roberts were the only persons who could have
been involved, and Roberts, by definition, could not have been an accessory
to his own crime, Weir was the only possible perpetrator,'and he had been
acquitted-there could have been no murder if there were no murderer!

Federal Jurisdiction-Multi-State Inheritance Taxation as Raising a "Controversy Between States"-Decedent's estate consisted of a
large amount of intangibles. Texas, Massachusetts, Florida, and New
York all claimed the right to collect an inheritance tax thereon on the
ground that decedent at his death was domiciled within their respective
jurisdictions. Texas filed a bill in the nature of interpleader, contending
that since taxation by all the states would more than deplete the estate
there was a controversy between the states, and asking the Court in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction to adjudicate the domiciliary question.
Held (Justices Frankfurter and Black dissenting),' that the Court had
jurisdiction and that Massachusetts was decedent's domiciliary state.
Texas v. Floridaet al, 6 U. S. L. WEEK 961 (U. S. Sup. Ct. 1939).
Many attempts have been made to have the Supreme Court prevent
multi-state inheritance taxation of intangibles by arbitrating the conflicting claims of the various states that the decedent died domiciled in their
respective jurisdictions. Prior to the instant case, such attempts have
consistently failed.2 Resort to the "controversy between the states" clause
of Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution as a device
to secure adjudication by the Supreme Court is not new with the instant
case. 3 In the Dorrance Estate litigation, New Jersey unsuccessfully attempted to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Court on the ground that
the conflicting domiciliary claims of New Jersey and Pennsylvania constituted a case or controversy between the two states. An examination of
the decisional confines of such jurisdiction makes obvious the reason for
New Jersey's failure. Only where a state, in its governmental capacity as
a sovereign, 4 invokes the jurisdiction of the Court to adjudicate an invasion
of its sovereign rights by another state is there a justiciable controversy
between states.5 Thus disputes involving boundaries, 6 water rights 7 and
stream diversions,8 pollution of streams, 9 and pro rating of debt burdens, 10
8. Instant case at 259. Two judges dissented.
i. The main bases for the dissent were: (i) That the formula "one man-one

domicile" became fictional in cases like the instant case and the Court should not apply
it; and (2) That jurisdiction should not be taken because it might lead to a flood of
kindred litigation. See 3 MoonE, FEDERAL. PRACTIcE (1938) 2208.
2. For a discussion of the various attempts that have been made see Chafee, The
FederalInterpleaderAct of 1936; 11 (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1161, 1169; (1937) 25 GEo.
L. J. 760; (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 844.

3. Iowa v. Slimmer et al., 248 U. S. 115 (1918) ; New Jersey v. Pennsylvania, 287
U. S. 580 (1933).
4. See DoaE, FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1928) 540, 541.

5. See cases cited infra notes 6-io.
6. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 14 Pet. 210 (U. S. 184o) ; Virginia v. Tennessee,
148 U. S.503 (1893) ; New Mexico v. Colorado, 267 U. S. 30 (1925).
7. Kansas v. Colorado, 2o6 U. S. 46 (1907).
8. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259

U. S.

419 (1922).

q. Missouri v. Illinois, 18o U. S. 208 (igoi) ; New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S.
296 (1921); cf. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S.23o (1907).
io. Virginia v. West Virginia, 206 U. S.290 (1907).
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have been held to come within the purview of the jurisdiction. In the
Dorrance Estate litigation there was obviously no offense against the
sovereignty of New Jersey, since even though Pennsylvania had assessed
and collected a tax there was nothing to prevent New Jersey from assessing and collecting one too. There was in that case nothing more than a
difference of opinion concerning a conflict of laws principle. In the instant
case, however, where the tax claims of all the domicile-claiming states
exceeded the total assets of the estate, the sovereign right of the one state
where the decedent actually was domiciled at his death to collect an inheritance tax "- was threatened with wrongful intrusion by the claims of
the other states. Therefore, in spite of the fact that the case departs from
traditional types,' 2 it seems that the Court's assumption of jurisdiction was
justifiable.

Federal Jurisdiction-Review of Orders of Federal Communications Commission-Negative Order Doctrine-The Rochester Telephone Corporation was ordered by the Federal Communications Commission to file schedules of its charges and to comply with orders applicable
to telephone carriers which were subject to the Communications Act of
1934. 1 The Corporation contended it was not subject to the provisions
of the Act. After an adverse ruling by the Commission, the Corporation
filed a bill in the district court to set aside the order. The court dismissed
the bill on the merits. 2 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Government
challenged the jurisdiction of both the district court and the Supreme
Court on the ground that the order was essentially negative in character,
and therefore not reviewable. Held, both courts had jurisdiction to pass
on the merits. 3 Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 6 U. S. L.
WEEK 1133 (U. S. Sup. Ct. 1939).

The "negative order" doctrine originated in 1912 in the case of
Procter and Gamble Co. v. United States.4 Under the doctrine, an order
of the Interstate Commerce Commission which is essentially negative in
character, in that it has no immediate legal effect, or in that the Commission declines to grant affirmative relief as prayed, will not be reviewed by
the federal courts. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter points out in his opinion,
its birth and growth was closely related to its environment, a stage in the
ii. It is hornbook law that a person can have only one domicile at one time. United
States ex rel. Thomas v. Day, 29 F. (2d) 485 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928) ; Worcester County
Trust Co. v. Long, 14 F. Supp. 754 (D. Mass. 1936).
Equally dogmatic is the rule that the domicile of the decedent at his death is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to the power of a state to impose an inheritance tax on intangibles, and that it is a denial of due process and equal protection for a state to impose
such a tax without a domiciliary basis for it. Farmers Loan & Trust Company v. Minnesota, 28o U. S. 204 (193o) ; First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312

(1932). Therefore, one state only has the right to assess an inheritance tax on intangibles, and should be protected from interference by other states with that right.
12. See cases cited supra notes 6-io.
I. 47 U. S. C. A. § 151 et seq. (Supp. 1938).
2. 23 F. Supp. 634 (1938).

3. But the order dismissing the bill on the merits was affirmed.
4. 225 U. S. 282 (1912). While almost all of the applications of the doctrine involved the Interstate Commerce Commission, it has been regarded as equally applicable
to similar federal administrative bodies as well. The 1934 Act expressly makes the
same provisions for enforcing or setting aside the orders of the Interstate Commerce
Commission applicable to orders of the Federal Communications Commission, 47 U. S.
C. A. § 402 (a)

(Supp. 1938).
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IOIX

Supreme Court's history when it was adjusting the judicial process to the
increased reliance upon administrative bodies.5 But the crystallization and
extension of the principles of primary jurisdiction B and administrative
finality 7 swept away the reason for the rule,s and its weaknesses made its
passing a matter of time only. Focussing on those weaknesses, the opinion
brings them into sharp relief. It points out that only in one type of situation 1 should the doctrine always bar relief; and review in this class of
cases is precluded anyway by applying the classic tests of whether a "case"
or "controversy" exists.' 0 In other cases the results were frequently unjust. Thus, in the Procter and Gamble case a refusal to grant relief
against the carrier as prayed by the shipper was immune from review; yet,
had the decision gone the other way and the relief been granted, the carrier
might complain to the courts." Furthermore, whether a given order was
5. Thus, the opinion in the instant case cites the fact that the Procter and Gamble
decision was written by Mr. Chief Justice White, whose stature in the development of
modern administrative law is unquestioned. As the latter himself wrote in that case,
one guiding consideration in the decision was that to construe the statute in question so
as to give the Commerce Court jurisdiction "would result in frustrating the legislative
public policy which led to the adoption of the act to regulate commerce, would render
impossible a resort to the remedies which the statute (creating the court) was enacted
to afford, would multiply the evils which the act to regulate commerce was adopted to
prevent, and thus bring about disaster by creating confusion and conflict where clearness and unity of action was (sic) contemplated." 225 U. S. at 294. Then, too, this
would seem to be in line with the then "growing policy of the Supreme Court . . .
to keep cases out of the court". Borchard, Justiciability (1936) 4 U. or Cxi. L. REv.
It 4.

6. Texas and Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426 (19o7) ; see
Note (1938) 51 HRV. L. REV. 1251. Under this doctrine, matters which call for highly
technical knowledge must first be passed upon by the commission in question before
judicial aid may be invoked.
7. By which the scope of the issues which are reviewable on appeal of administrative orders is narrowly confined. See Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois
Cent. R. R., 215 U. S. 452, 470 (91o).
8. The significance of the reasoning is lost unless it is kept in mind that the Justice
who wrote the opinion is the author of such papers as the Foreword (1938) 47 YALE
L. J. 515, and The Task of Administrative Law (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 614.
9. The opinion divides prior decisions involving the "negative order" doctrine into
three categories:
a. Where the order in question forbids or compels conduct by the one seeking review only if some further action is taken by the Commission.
b. Where the order declines to relieve the complainant from a statutory command.
c. Where the order is attacked because it does not forbid or compel conduct by a
third person.
The situation to which the opinion refers as being properly subject to the doctrine
is division a.
1O. Therefore, the only criteria for reviewability of administrative orders are: (I)
Does such a "case" or "controversy" exist? For some of the difficulties in answering
this question see FRANEFrRT. AND SHULMAN, CASES ON FEmERA JURISDICTION AND
PROCEDURE (rev. ed. 1937) c. I; Borchard, supra note 5. (2) The conventional requi-

sites of equity jurisdiction. It has been pointed out that this second is very much akin
to the first. Note (1927) 27 COL. L. REV. 450, 453, n. 25, 26. (3) The specific terms
of the statute granting to the federal courts jurisdiction to review the orders of the
Commission. The importance of this consideration cannot be too strongly emphasized;
it would seem to provide the only justification for disregarding ordinary tests of federal jurisdiction, which once met, make jurisdiction mandatory.
ii. This criticism, made by the Court in the instant case, is not new. 2
SHARFMAN, TEE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COmissIoN (1931)

416.

See also McFAR-

LAND, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND TEE INTERSTATE
COM4MERCE COMMISSION (1933) 138: "Doubtless the doctrine was less objectionable in

the earlier days of regulation when the function of the commission was the correction
of abuses rather than the control of a national transportation system under complete
regulation; . . . under the present system of complete regulation a denial to one
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"affirmative" or "negative" frequently was difficult to determine. 2 In
the instant case, Mr. Justice Butler regarded the order as one which "unmistakably puts appellant under a series of affirmative mandates which, if
valid, may be enforced under the Act". 13 Consequently, he argued, the
path for review is clear, and so there was no occasion to call the doctrine
into question. Both the premise and the reasoning on which this conclusion is based might well be questioned. 14 But in any case, few laments
for the doctrine will be raised on its demise.'3

Mortgages-Right of Assuming Grantee to Be Subrogated to
First Mortgage Paid by Him in Ignorance of Recorded Second Mortgage-A mortgaged the land in question to bank for $950 and then mortgaged for $8oo to plaintiff who duly recorded his mortgage. Thereafter,
A conveyed to defendant subject to all encumbrances in consideration of
$4 and defendant's promise to pay the bank's mortgage. Defendant duly
paid the bank's mortgage and entered into possession. Plaintiff sought
foreclosure of his mortgage and defendant asked that he be subrogated
to the rights of the bank on the grounds that he had no knowledge of
defendant's mortgage and that A had represented that there were no encumbrances other than those expressly assumed. Held, that the defendant was not entitled to be subrogated to the first mortgage because as
to the payment of that debt he was a mere volunteer and may not complain of the results of his own negligence in taking the land subject to
plaintiff's mortgage.

Belcher v. Belcher, 87 P. (2d) 762 (Ore. 1939).

While it is difficult to refute the strict rule applied by the instant
court on logical grounds, it appears to the present writer that the more
practical result is reached by those courts which allow subrogation in the
type of case here involved.- It is generally established that payment of a
party may amount to a grant to another." "But the use of the affirmative or negative
test as the criterion for determining what orders are of wide public interest seems only
slightly related to the facts." Note (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 766, 787.
12. See footnote 24 of the opinion in the instant case. The doctrine is aptly compared to "the outmoded line between 'nonfeasance' and 'misfeasance' ". 6 U. S. L WEsK
at 1136.
13. Concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Butler, id. at 1138.
14. The argument seems to be that the order was undoubtedly affirmative in character. Therefore, since the Government itself raised the objection based on the doctrine, and since even the application of the doctrine defeats the contention of the Government, why go to the extent of overruling it? But to this there are several answers.
First, unless Mr. Justice Butler was willing to disapprove the reasoning of such cases
as Lehigh Valley R. R. v. United States, 243 U. S. 412 (1917), or was willing to maintain a distinction between that case and the instant one, the Lehigh case would seem to
govern. In other words, could not the case at bar come within division b of note 9,
mspra?
Second, the argument is based on the apparent assumption that it is sufficient to
consider a challenge to jurisdiction only so far as is necessary to defeat the partisan
challenge. But in fact "the court is bound to ask and answer (the question of jurisdiction) for itself, even when not otherwise suggested, and without respect to the relation of the parties to it". Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. v. Swan, iii U. S. 397, 382
(1884) ; DoBIE, FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1928) 28.
15. The doctrine calls to mind the general observation of Professor Borchard:
"The very system of stare decisis invites courts to relieve themselves of the necessity of
thinking through again ostensible propositions which seem to have once received the
stamp of approval. . . ." Borchard, supra note 5, at I.
I. For an exposition of the two views see Notes (1925) 37 A. L. R. 384, 386 et
seq., (1938) 113 A. L. R. 958, and cases cited therein.
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mortgage by one who is primarily obligated to pay the same, extinguishes
it as to junior lienors. 2 In the case of the assuming grantee, this result
follows under the doctrine of merger despite the fact that the assuming
grantee has purported to "buy" rather than "pay" the first mortgage.3 A
possible rationale of this compulsory merger may be found in the intention
expressed between the grantee and the mortgagor-grantor that the grantee
should pay the first mortgage and leave the land available for the payment
of the second mortgage. If the grantee suffered the land to be sold on
foreclosure by the first mortgagee, he would be liable for the amount the
latter might have to pay to the second mortgagee by reason of the release
of the land which was to be primarily liable for this debt.4 By this reasoning, then, the grantee, not the land, is ultimately liable for the first mortgage debt. Consequently, there is no reason to subrogate him to a claim
against himself. If, however, he has been induced to promise by reason
of the fraud of the grantor, or because of the grantor's misrepresentation
of a material fact, he is, in equity, entitled to have the agreement set aside.The question then, is whether payment of the debt before discovery of the
fraud or mistake operates to give him rights against the land which he did
not have before. Until he rescinds, he is primarily liable for the debt and
consequently cannot be subrogated. Upon rescission, he is entitled to a
return of the consideration, which, of course, includes the amount paid to
the first mortgagee as part of the purchase price, and by the great weight
of authority, he is given an equitable lien on the land for the amount so
due from the grantor.6 But logically it is difficult to see how this lien can
be given priority over the prior lien of the second mortgagee. Such, then
is the legalistic reason for the result reached by the instant court. However, despite these technical difficulties in the way of subrogation, since
the assuming grantee might, had he known of the second mortgage, have
bought the equity of redemption without the promise to pay the first mortgage, and then bought the first mortgage without thereby effecting a
merger,7 other courts of equity have felt no qualms about pretending
that this is what the grantee did, and according to him, under the
pseudonym of "subrogation", the same rights as if he had." Since the
rights of the junior lienor are not thereby injured, there seems no real
reason for not allowing this result.

Taxation-Ground Rents Not Constitutionally Taxable Under
Pennsylvania Personal Property Tax-The personal property tax 1
was assessed to resident trustees of ground rents on land in Delaware and
England. Held, that the tax was unconstitutional as applied to such rents
because they are real estate and thus Pennsylvania had no jurisdiction to
2. 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 2666-7.
3. 2 JOES, MORTGAGES (7th ed. 1915) § 858; 3 TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed.
192o) 2612-3.

4. See Birke v. Abbott, lO3 Ind. I, I N. E. 485 (1885) ; Gulling v. Washoe County
Bank, 24 Nev. 477, 56 Pac. 58o (1899).
5. RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS (1932) §§ 140, 476.
6. Syck v. Hellier, 140 Ky. 388, 131 S. W. 30 (1910); (1923) 36 HARv. L. REv.
891.
7. Burgoon v. Lavezzo, 92 F. (2d) 726 (App. D. C. 1937).
8. Williams v. Libby, 11S Me. So, O5 Atl. 855 (I919).
See also cases collected in
A. L. R. Notes supra note I.
I. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1938) tit. 72, § 3242.
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tax. In re Girard Trust Co., Trustees, et al., Phila. Legal Intelligencer,
Mar. 16, 1939, p. I, col. 5 (Pa. C. P. 1939).

Although there is language in the early cases treating ground rents as
personalty, 2 since the decision of Ingersoll v. Sergeant' holding that
Penn's grant did not come under the statute quia emptores they have been
considered as an interest in real estate for all purposes, including taxation
where the terre tenant has been assessed the full value of the fee 4 and the
ground rent landlord additionally for the value of his reserved service.'
Accepting this historical definition of ground rents; there is no doubt that
the instant decision is correct for a state may not tax interests in land
situated beyond its borders.6 Yet a ground rent performs the same function as a purchase money mortgage; 7 the remedies for the enforcement
being identical in effect since, on default, the landlord can sue in assumpsit
for the debt,3 or bring distraint to recover the land.9 Because of this
similarity, the case is not easily reconciled with the tax on mortgages which
is constitutionally applicable to resident creditors whose debts are secured
by mortgages on foreign land; 10 although not to mortgages on land in the
state which are held by nonresident creditors. 1 Such taxes are allowed
on the grounds that the debt is the thing taxed rather than the real estate
collateral and in only one state are mortgages taxed as realty; there only
by virtue of a special statute.1 2 It is further permissible to tax mortgaged
land without deducting the value of the incumbrance, 13 which has also been
true of land subject to ground rent. 14 It follows then, if the appellate
court be willing to disregard a concept developed by over one hundred
years of common law and treat them, for purposes of taxation, as mortgages since they function as such, that the instant tax statute would be
constitutionally applicable to ground rents. Under the decision of the
court creditors are furnished with a security device free of personal property taxes. Whether in Pennsylvania the ground rents may be taxed to
the landlord as real estate without violating the uniformity clause of the
state constitution 15 is an open question. Such a tax would result in land
2. See Philadelphia Library Co. v. Ingham, i Whart. 72, 85 (Pa. 1835).
3. I Whart. 337 (Pa. 1836).

4. Franciscus v. Reigart, 4 Watts 98 (Pa. 1835).
5. Robinson v. Allegheny County, 7 Pa. 161 (1847).
6. Louisville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385 (1902) ; Senior v. Braden, 295
U. S. 422 (1935).
7. CADNWALADER, GROUND RENTS (1879)

§§ 100, 101, 102.
8. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit 68, § 211.
9. CADWALADER, op. cit. supra note 7, § 97; see PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit.

68, §215.

io. Kirkland v. Hotchkiss, iOo U. S. 491 (879);

Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania

Coal Co., 197 Pa. 551, 47 Atl. 740 (19Ol).

ii. State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300 (1872), which overruled an
earlier attempt by Pennsylvania to tax such mortgages in Maltby v. Reading & Columbia R. R. Co., 52 Pa. 140 (1866).

12. Grand Lodge, A. 0. U. W. of Nebraska v. Sarpy County, 99 Neb. 647, 157 N.
W. 344 (1916).
13. Stumpf v. Storz, 156 Mich. 228, 12o N. W. 618 (19o9); Phila. Saving Fund
Soc. v. Yard, 9 Pa. 354 (1848). The same result is reached where both the land and
the lease thereof are taxed. Hull v. Luzerne County, 93 Pa. 502 (188o).
14. Robinson v. Allegheny County, 7 Pa. 161 (1847).
15. See Note (1938) 87 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 219. The instant court suggests that
Senior v. Braden, 295 U. S. 422 (I935), stands for the proposition that the tax considered in the instant case might also be bad because, being applicable only to resident held
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subject to ground rents being taxed at higher amounts than unincumbered
realty and since the court has been more strict in requiring uniformity of
property taxes, the tax may
not be allowed, thereby freeing ground rents
16
from either type of tax.

Torts-Liability of a Charitable Corporation for the Negligence
of Its Employees-The defendant, through an arrangement with the
Works Progress Administration, obtained the services of the deceased for
general repair work in its building. While so employed the deceased sustained fatal injuries caused by the negligence of an employee of the defendant. In a suit commenced by the deceased and continued by his
administrator, the defendant contended that, as a non-profit charitable corporation,' it was exempt from liability for injuries occasioned through the
negligence of its employees. Held, that the immunity of a charitable corporation extends only to beneficiaries of the charity and that, therefore,
since the deceased did not fall within that class, the defendant was liable.
Andrews v. Young Men's ChristianAssociation of Des Moines, 284 N. W.
186 (Iowa 1939).

That a beneficiary of a charitable corporation may not recover for
injuries caused by the negligence of corporate employees appears to be
well settled.2 Therefore, the defendant in the instant case contended that,
by allowing the deceased to take advantage of the arrangement made between the defendant and the W. P. A., it was indirectly benefiting him so
as to preclude him from asserting liability on the part of the charity. It is
patent that the court was correct in overthrowing that contention. 3 However, the necessity for such an original distinction seems dubious. In
reaching its decision the court delved into the maze of conflicting rules and
rationales 4 concerning the liability of charitable corporations, 5 discarded
ground rents and not non-resident, it violates the uniformity clause. But since in that
case the question was neither raised nor discussed, the suggestion is without merit.

i6. This and further advantages of the ground rent as a financing mechanism are

set forth in Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Mar. 20, 1939, p. 7, col. i. But cf. Harvey Coal

& Coke Co. v. Dillon, 59 W. Va. 6o5 (I9o5), where, in an analogous situation involving
leases of mineral rights, such a tax has been sustained.

i. There seems to be but little question that a Young Men's Christian Association

constitutes a charitable corporation. Averback v. Y. M. C. A. of Covington, 25o Ky.
34, 61 S. W. (2d) io66 (933); Betts v. Y. M. C. A. of Erie, 83 Pa. Super. 545
(924).
Contra: Chapin v. Holyoke Y. M. C. A., 165 Mass. 28o, 42 N. E. 1130 (1896).
2. Mikota v. Sisters of Mercy and Mercy Hospital, 183 Iowa 1378, 168 N. W. 219
(I918). A qualification of this broad statement of the rule is that if the injury can be
traced directly to negligence on the part of the charity in,the selection of its employees,
liability will be imposed. Other states have also thus qualified the general rule. See
Zollman, Damage Liability of Charitable Institutions (1921) ig MIcH. L. REV. 395,401 et seq. This distinction, however, was not made in the instant opinion.
3. Especially does this appear when it is considered that the defendant obtained the
services of the deceased at no expense to itself. On the general topic see Note (1923)
8 CORN. L. Q. 146.
4. See Appleman, The Tort Liability of Charitable Institutions (1936) 22 A. B.
A. J.5.48;
Note (925) 34 YALE L. J. 316.
As a general rule Pennsylvania appears to exempt the charity from liability regardless of the character of the injured person. Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 12o Pa.
624, I5 Atl. 553 (1888) (stranger) ; Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75
Atl. IO87 (igio) (paying patient) ; Betts v. Y. M. C. A. of Erie, 83 Pa. Super. 545
(1924).
Although Wildoner v. Central Poor District of Luzerne County, 267 Pa. 375,
11o Atl. 175 (192o), is frequently cited as a decision upholding the general rule, there
the court appeared to grant immunity on the ground that the organization was performing a governmental function. An apparent exception to the rule is that where the
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the "trust fund theory" 6 and the "waiver theory" 7 and declared that the
sole base was public policy. That public policy was determined by the
prevailing needs and modes of life was readily admitted, but why these
factors decreed that, in the case of a beneficiary, it is better for the individual to suffer and bear the loss, while, where the injured party is an
employee, invitee or stranger, public policy demands that the loss be shifted
to the community, the court did not explain. Indeed, there were portions
of the opinion that appeared to favor liability even as to a beneficiary. 8
Whether this opinion will serve as a foundation for future decisions allowing compensation to beneficiaries of a charity, is impossible to foretell.
However, it would appear that, in view of modern methods in the administration of charity, public policy demands that liability be imposed irrespective of the status of the injured party. 9 There is no reason why a
corporate charity should not expend a portion of its revenue in insurance ' 0
and, by so doing, act in accordance with the modem tendency to spread
the risk of loss upon as wide a base as possible. Furthermore, by imposing
a duty upon the corporation to act with due care in respect to the recipients
of the charity, courts will be affording better protection to the very class
which the charities attempt to assist."

Torts-Prenatal Injuries to Infants-Plaintiff alleged that defendants, doctors, gave x-ray treatments to plaintiff's mother after diagnosing
her ailment as tumor of the womb, whereas, in fact, she was pregnant.
The treatments were continued until after plaintiff was seven months
matured, and plaintiff was born severely burned, feeble-minded, and a permanent cripple. Plaintiff died subsequent to the bringing of the action,
injury occurs in a situation not directly connected with the administration of the
charity, liability will be imposed and the damages should be charged to maintenance by
the charity. Winnemore v. Philadelphia, 18 Pa. Super. 625 (19o2). Cf. Reavy v.
Guild of St. Agnes, 284 Mass. 30o, 187 N. E. 557 (1933).
6. The rationale of this theory is that to make the charitable corporation liable in
damages would divert the trust funds from the purpose for which they were set apart,
and thus render the charity less able to perform its intended function. It is now well
established that such reasoning is merely a cloak for an expression of public policy.
Thompson, A Step Toward Tort Liability of CharitableInstitutions in Oregon (1937)
16 ORm. L. Ray. 357, 36o.
7. This theory applied to beneficiaries of the charity and proceeded on the implication that persons seeking the services of a charity agreed to waive any right to hold it
liable for injuries. The obvious inadequacies of such reasoning when applied to unconscious and demented persons have been the subject of much discussion. See Feezer,
The Tort Liability of Charitios (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 191, 202 et seq. Another
argument which the court discarded is that liability should be imposed only where the
master will profit through the ordinary functions of his agent or employees and that,
therefore, where the master obtained no advantage, liability should not be imposed.
See Zollman, Damage Liability of CharitableInstitutions (1921) 19 MicH. L. REV. 395,
405 et seq.
8. Thus: "There is nothing which so begets and fosters care and diligence as responsibility. . . . And nowhere is the exercise of the highest degree of care so necessary, and so to be desired, as in ministering to the sick and the helpless, and those relying entirely upon the skill and superior knowledge of some one else." Instant case
at 2o6.

9. See Note (1918) 31 IARv. L. REv. 479. This seems to be the prevailing view
among contributors to legal periodicals.
Io. Appleman, The Tort Liability of CharitableInstitutions (1936) 22 A. B. A. J.
48, 55; (1939) 6 U. OF Cin. L. Ray. 518, 520.
II. Note (1937) 12 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 99, io6.
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which was continued by plaintiff's mother as administratrix.1 Defendant's
motion to dismiss the complaint was granted. Held, the judgment should
be affirmed because binding precedents deny the existence of any cause of
action for injuries inflicted on an infant in utero. Smith v. Luckhardt, 19
N. E. (2d) 446 (Ill. App. 1939).
The case authority is in almost universal accord with the proposition
that an infant may not recover for prenatal injuries. 2 This virtual unanimity
is in sharp contrast with the prevailing view of text and law review writers
who have given consideration to the subject.' It has been variously argued
by those opposed to recovery that the law has never recognized such a
right in unborn children, 4 that a child en ventre sa mere does not constitute
a separate legal entity,5 that a recovery by the mother for injuries to herself may include damages for the injury to the child, 6 and that the danger
of fabrication and uncertainty of proof of the causal connection between
defendant's liability creating conduct and plaintiff's injury is so great that7
it is inadvisable to admit the existence of a cause of action in the child.
On the other hand, those seeking recovery assert that contrary precedent
is no basis for denial of recovery, because the essence of the common law
is adaptability to new conditions, and the advances of medical science warrant the recognition of a new cause of action.8 It is said that a child partis
erty law, provided the child's interests are served thereby,9 and hence there
should be recognition as a legal entity for the purpose of protecting the
child's interests in personality; 10 that the criminal law has recognized the
legal entity of the child who, after birth, dies as a result of prenatal injuries, in order to convict of murder or manslaughter the one inflicting
such injuries. 1 Furthermore, it is urged that recovery by the mother does
i. Although plaintiff was thirteen years old at the time of the bringing of the action,
the problem of the Statute of Limitations was not considered by the court in the instant
case.
2. See cases collected in Notes (1922) 2o A. L. R. 1505; (1935) 97 A. L. R. 1524.
Contra: Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 D. & C. 227 (Pa. C. P. 1924) ; Montreal TramNways
Co. v. Leveille, (1933) S. C. R. 456 (Canada), (1933) 4 D. L. R. 337. Cf. Walker v.
Great Northern Ry., 28 Ir. L. R. 69, 74 (i89i) (dictum to effect that there might be
recovery if the injuries to the child were inflicted intentionally).
It should be noted that some of the earlier cases were characterized by cogent dissents. Windes, J. (Appellate Court) and Boggs, J. (Supreme Court) in Allaire v. St.
Luke's Hospital, 76 Ill. App. 441, 450 (1898) ; 184 Ill. 359, 368, 56 N. E. 638, 64o
(igoo) ; O'Brien, C. J., in Walker v. Great Northern Ry., 28 Ir. L. R. 69, 72 (1891).
The late Mr. Justice Cardozo dissented without opinion in Drobner v. Peters, 232 N. Y.
220, 224, 133 N. E. 567, 568 (1921).
3. 1 BEvEN, NEGLIGENCE (4th ed. 1928) 73-76; 1 JoYcE, DAMAGES (1903) § 308;
SALmoND, TORTS (7th ed. 1928) § 118 (4) ; Anderson, Rights of Action of an Unborn
Child (1936) 14 TENx. L. REv. 151; Frey, Injuries to Infants En Ventre Sa Mere
(1927) 12 ST. Louis L. REv. 85; Kerr, Actions by Unborn Infant (195) 61 CExT. L.
J. 364; Morris, Injuries to Infants En Ventre Sa Mere (1927) 58 CENT. L. J. 143;
Straub, Right of Action for PrenatalInjuries (1930) 33 LAW NOTEs 205.
4. See instant case at 451, wherein the court indicates that precedent, rather than
the merits of the case, was the determining factor in the instant decision, and that any
change in the law will have to be brought about by legislative action.
5. Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
6. Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 611, io8 So. 566 (1926);
Snow v. Allen, 227 Ala. 6,5, 151 So. 468 (ig3i).
7. Walker v. Great Northern Ry., 28 Ir. L. R. 69 (189i). See Note (1935) 44
YALE L. J. 1468.
8. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 157-158; (1924) 72 U. oF PA. L. REv. 455.

viscerum matris has been recognized as a legal entity for purposes of prop9. See Note (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1468, 1469, and cases cited therein, nn. 9-14.
io. See (1938) 36 MIcH. L. REv. 512.
ii. See (1927) 3o LAw NOTES 183. The suggestion is made therein that permitting
criminal conviction of one who injures a child en ventre sa mere is totally inconsistent
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not adequately compensate for the harm to the infant. 12 This conflict between courts and legal theorists is indicative of the fact that the legalistic
reasons advanced for barring recovery are not sound, and that the real
reason behind the courts' decisions is the practical aspect of uncertainty
of proof. Yet this reason for denial of recovery would apply as well to a
recovery by the mother which includes damages for the injury to the
infant. Furthermore, it has been suggested by a court denying recovery
that there should be a cause of action if the injury were inflicted intentionally,'" although the same objection of uncertainty of proof would apply
in such a situation. Moreover, it is doubtful whether mere danger of
fabrication should be offered as a reason for allowing an injury to go
unredressed, 14 particularly since the burden of showing a causal connection between the liability creating conduct and the injury rests on the
plaintiff.' 5 It is submitted that even if such a basis for denial of recovery
was at one time pertinent, the advances of modern embryology allow certainty of proof 16 and make it imperative for the courts to desert a precedent
which has outlived its purpose.
Trusts-Necessary Consenting Parties to Revocation of Inter
Vivos Trust-Settlor transferred securities in trust to pay the income
to settlor for life, trustee being authorized to make payments aggregating
no more than $15,000 out of principal to settlor;1 trust to terminate on
settlor's death and the principal to be paid to his wife if she survived him,
otherwise to such persons as settlor should name in his will, or, in default
of such appointment, to his distributees under the intestate law. Settlor,
having obtained the consent of his wife and of his brother who was the
only other person entitled to take by descent if settlor were to die intestate
at that time, seeks to revoke the trust under § 23 of the Personal Property
Law 2 allowing revocation upon obtaining the consent of all persons beneficially interested. Held (two judges dissenting), revocation refused since
by the trust agreement settlor, instead of reserving the reversion to himwith a denial of civil recovery on the grounds of the conjectural nature of the proof
necessary to establish the civil cause of action. This suggestion overlooks the difference
between "proof beyond reasonable doubt" in criminal cases and "belief from the preponderance of evidence" in civil actions; it also disregards the fact that, practically
speaking, a jury would be much less willing to find a causal connection in criminal
prosecutions.
12. See JoycF, loc. cit. supra note 2. The instant case is a good example of this
objection. It is not shown that there was any direct injury to the mother from the
x-ray treatments, hence it is highly dubious that she would have any cause of action at
all, except possible recovery for loss of services. To allow recovery to the mother instead of the child in such a case seems a circuitous method of providing redress for an
injury, since the child is really the party in interest. Furthermore, it is difficult to see
how the objection to the conjectural nature of proof required to establish causal relationship is overcome through recovery by the mother. But see Note (1935) 44 YALE
L. J. 1468.
13. Walker v. Great Northern Ry., 28 Ir. L. R. 69, 74 (i8qi).
14. See Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 D. & C. 227, 229 (Pa. C. P. 1924).
I5. See Note (192) 34 HARv. L. REV. 549.
16. See MALoy, LEAAL ANATomy & SURGERY (1930) 732, and authorities cited
therein, in regard to the danger to the fetus of any x-ray treatments of the mother.
i. The total value of the corpus did not appear.

2. "Upon the written consent of all the persons beneficially interested in a trust in
personal property or any part thereof heretofore or hereafter created, the creator of such
trust may revoke the same as to the whole or such part thereof, and thereupon the estate
of the trustee shall cease in the whole or such part thereof." N. Y. Laws (i9o9) c.
247, § 23, N. Y. CONSoL. LAws (Cahill, i93o) c. 42, § 23.

RECENT CASES

self, created a contingent remainder in those who would have taken by
descent on settlor's death intestate, and not a remainder vested in, or an
equivalent reversion vested in those who would have taken by descent if
settlor had died intestate at the time of the attempted revocation. These
contingent remaindermen, not all of whom had consented, were "beneficially interested" within the meaning of the statute.3 Engel v. Guaranty
Trust Co. of New York, 19 N. E. (2d) 673 (N. Y. Ct. of App. 1939).
At common law all parties beneficially interested in trust property,
including the settlor, if they are in existence and sui juris, may terminate
the trust by mutual consent,4 and this rule has been interpreted to require
the consent of all remaindermen however contingent their interest.5 Thus
it is evident that this "consent" doctrine has been rendered practically ineffective in many cases involving unborn or unascertainable remaindermen.
Prior to the adoption of the statute involved in the instant case New York
did not recognize the common law rule,6 and whether the purpose of the
statute was merely to invoke the common law rule as it exists elsewhere
or to provide a more effective method of termination by requiring only
the consent of those who would be entitled to the property if the particular
estate were presently to fail has been the subject of considerable difference
of opinion. 7 In numerous cases the courts have avoided this difficulty by
construing the terms of the trust agreement as indicating the settlor's intent
to reserve a reversion in himself rather than to create a remainder in his
distributees.5 In such a situation his next of kin would take, not by purchase through the trust agreement, but by descent, the latter interest being
merely an expectancy and destructible at the whim of the settlor.0 But
the instant court, having construed the trust as creating a remainder, is
fairly confronted with the problem of statutory interpretation. 0 Inasmuch
as either interpretation is equally logical from an abstract viewpoint, it
3. The court apparently refused to pass on the rights of unborn persons under the
statute (instant case at 675), yet their inclusion would seem to follow logically and
make compliance with the provisions of the statute impossible. But see Cram v. Walker,
173 App. Div. 8o4, i6o N. Y. Supp. 486 (ist'Dep't, 1916), discussed in Note (1937) 22
CORN. L. Q. 434.
4. 1 PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1929) § 704, and cases cited therein; RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS (935) § 338; Note (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 7005, 1014, and cases cited
therein. See Scott, Fifty Years of Trusts (1936) 5o HARv. L. Rw. 6o, 71-72.
5. Note (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 7005, ioi6.
6. Hoskin v. Long Island Loan & Trust Co., 139 App. Div. 258, 123 N. Y. Supp.
994 (2d Dep't, igio), aff'd on ophiion below, 2o3 N. Y. 588, 96 N. E. III6 (7917);
Note (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 7005, O18. In Merrell, Revocation of Inter Vivos Trusts
in New York (937) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 431, 433, it is indicated that the New York
rule prior to the statute was conitra the common-law rule only with respect to trusts to
receive and apply or accumulate income.
7. See Merrell, supra note 6, 443 et seq., and cases discussed therein; Note (937)
46 YALE L. J. 1005, 1021.
8. Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., 162 App. Div. 6o7, 147 N. Y. Supp. 1O58
(Ist Dep't, 194) ; Cruger v. Union Trust Co., 173 App. Div. 797, 16o N. Y. Supp. 480
(Ist Dep't, 1916) ; Davies v. City Bank-Farmers Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 380, 288 N.
Y. Supp. 398 (ist Dep't, 1936). But cf. Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., 25o N. Y.
298, 16s N. E. 454 (1929). Finch, J. (with whom Rippey, J., concurred), dissenting
in the instant case, construed the trust as reserving a reversion.
9. See Schoellkopf v. Marine Trust Co., 267 N. Y. 358, 363, 196 N. E. 288, 290
(I935). In general, with regard to the difficulty of determining whether the words of
the trust agreement reserve a reversion or create a remainder, and some of the factors
influencing such determination, see Merrell, supranote 6, 436 et seq.
io. Apparently the instant case marks the first time the Court of Appeals has
passed on this precise issue, and it has been predicted that such a result as was herein
reached xvill lead to a revision of the statute. Merrell, supra note 6, at 450.
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would seem that the result reached by the instant court is the more desirable in the light of the fact that a contrary result would involve the creation
of a new property concept wherein the interests which, on vesting, would
have vested by purchase may be destroyed without the beneficiaries' consent. 1 The creation of such a concept should follow only from a clearly
manifested intent on the part of the legislature. 12
ii. See Note (1937) 46 YALE L.

J.

1OO5,

12. See Merrell, supra note 6, at 450.

ioi8,

io22.

